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____________ ,) 
NO. 39227 
IDAHO COUNTY NO. CR 2008-39246 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ronald E. Anderson asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No.805 (Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2013) 
(hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment of 
Conviction, was in conflict with Idaho Supreme Court precedent, as well as the Court of 
Appeals' own precedent and, therefore, this Court should exercise its review authority. 
Specifically, in regard to the failure to preserve a copy of the written post-proof 
jury instructions, the Court of Appeals held that, because Mr. Anderson had not pointed 
to "specific prejudice arising from the missing instructions," there was no violation of his 
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constitutional right to due process. (Opinion, p.7.) That conclusion is contrary to this 
Court's decision in State v. Upham, 52 Idaho 340, _, 14 P.2d 1101, 1102 (1932) 
which holds that the written instructions are "an essential part of the record on appeal," 
and this Court's decisions in State v. Zielinski, 119 Idaho 316, 318 (1991), 
State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 51 (1990), State v. Martinez, 92 Idaho 148, 149-50 
(1968), and Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho 630, 636 (1967), which all hold that deprivation 
of an adequate record on appeal is, in and of itself, a violation of the defendant's due 
process rights. The Opinion is also contrary to the Court of Appeals decision in State v. 
Walsh, 141 Idaho 870, 877 (Ct. App. 2005), which explains that the reason the absence 
of the written instructions means the record is insufficient is that it deprives the appellate 
court of the ability to evaluate the propriety of the instructions, since the format of the 
instructions may show error, even though the language used is technically correct 
(State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 589-92 (2011)). 
Add1t1onally, in regard to the argument on prosecutorial misconduct, the Court of 
Appeals found two instances of misconduct (Opinion pp.12-13), and potentially at least 
more (see Opinion, p.8 (stating that the Court of Appeals did not "condone" other 
statements made by the prosecutor)), and yet, refused to apply the cumulative error 
test. (Opinion, pp.18-19 (holding that, since the errors were individually harmless under 
the Court of Appeals' fundamental error analysis, Mr. Anderson had "failed to 
demonstrate at least two errors, a necessary predicate to the application of our 
cumulative error doctrine").) That conclusion is directly contrary to this Court's decision 
in State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994), as well as the Court of Appeals' 
decisions in State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002), and 
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State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 513 (Ct. App. 1998), all of which describe the 
cumulative error doctrine as applying when there are two errors which are individually 
harmless, because the two errors considered together may demonstrate that the 
overarching error was not harmless. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals' analysis under the harmless error doctrine is 
in contravention with this Court's decision in State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 600-01 
(2013), since it considered whether the errors were harmless when the State had not 
forwarded any argument in that regard. Even so, its conclusion is inconsistent with this 
Court's decisions in State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 111 ( 1979) and State v. Spencer, 
74 Idaho 173, 184 (1953), which hold that, when there is a reasonable possibility that 
the errors influenced the verdict, they are not harmless. Considering that the district 
court made it clear that the issue of guilt was debatable on the evidence presented, 
even though the Court of Appeals viewed the evidence differently, there was a 
reasonable possibility that the jurors shared the district court's perspective, and thus, 
the errors were not harmless. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Anderson was working construction in Missoula, Montana in the spring of 
2010. (Supp. Tr., p.219, Ls.13-16.)1 As that project wound down, his employer helped 
1 The transcripts in this case are contained in several, individually paginated volumes. 
To promote clarity, the volume containing the majority of the transcripts, (such as the 
final pretrial hearing, et al.) will be referred to as "Vol.1." The volume containing the 
transcript of his sentencing hearing will be referred to as "Vol.2." In addition, the Idaho 
Supreme Court took judicial notice of the contents in its file from the State's prior appeal 
in this case (docket number 36319). (Order Granting Motion that the Court take Judicial 
Notice, filed May 17, 2012.) Included in that record are the transcripts of the trial itself, 
as well as the February 12, 2009, hearing on Mr. Anderson's motion for a new trial. 
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him get a position doing different maintenance-type jobs at the Lochsa Lodge near 
Powell, ldaho.2 (Supp. Tr., p.220, Ls.2-14; Supp. Tr., p.76, Ls.17-25.) That job began 
at the end of May, and Mr. Anderson only planned on staying there until July. 
(Supp. Tr., p.221, Ls.3-9; p.223, Ls.9-13.) However, during that time he was charged 
with raping another of the employees there, SJM. (See R., p.21.) He exercised his 
right to a trial, where a jury found him guilty. (R., p.68.) The district court initially 
granted Mr. Anderson's motion for a new trial when a material witness, whose 
whereabouts had been unknown at the time of the trial, was located. (R., pp.95-108.) 
That decision, however, was reversed on appeal. (See Docket Number 36319, Court of 
Appeals 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 610.) On remand, Mr. Anderson was 
sentenced to a unified term of eighteen years, with nine years fixed. (R., pp.161-62.) 
According to Mr. Anderson, he had seen SJM around the Lodge, as they both 
worked there. (See, e.g., Supp. Tr., p.229, Ls.14-23.) Their relationship was "U]ust the 
normal casual thing . . . . She was friendly. I was friendly. Respectable, as always, 
and that was it." (Supp. Tr., p.235, Ls.20-23.) Mr. Anderson testified that, on the night 
in question, he went down to the bar where several other lodge employees, including 
SJM, were spending their evening. (See generally Supp. Tr., pp.237-39.) Both 
Mr. Anderson and SJM admitted to drinking alcohol. (Supp. Tr., p.242, L.7; p.192, 
Ls.14-15.) SJM testified to having four beers at the bar, she also testified that she had 
a "Vodka Red Bull" before going to the bar. (Supp. Tr., p.195, L.23 - p.196, L.3.) As a 
Those transcripts are contained in two volumes which are consecutively paginated. 
Therefore, they will be collectively referred to as "Supp. Tr." 
2 The Lodge has a street address in Lolo, Montana, for emergency services purposes. 
(Supp. Tr., p.76, Ls.17-19.) The Lodge itself is in Idaho County. (See, e.g., Supp. 
Tr., p.124, Ls.4-6.) 
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result, she was feeling "buzzed" by the end of the evening. (Supp. Tr., p.192, Ls.14-15.) 
Mr. Anderson admitted to having about five beers. (Supp. Tr., p.242, L.7.) 
Mr. Anderson testified that SJM was being exceedingly friendly toward him after 
she got in an argument with one of the other lodge workers, Chris Prall. (See Supp. 
Tr., p.239, L.18 - p.240, L.18.) Mr. Prall and SJM were in a dating-type relationship. 
(Supp. Tr., p.205, Ls.15-17.) She confirmed that they had been in an argument at the 
bar that evening and agreed to go their separate ways, but said they reconciled the next 
day. (Tr., p.205, Ls.18-23.) SJM testified that she left the bar at approximately 9:30. 
(See Supp. Tr., p.196, Ls.9-16.) She returned to the trailer she shared with Jason 
Black, who left after she returned. (Supp. Tr., p.178, Ls.10-25.) 
Mr. Anderson testified that Mr. Black came down to the bar and they left together. 
(Supp. Tr., p.245, L.15 - p.246, L.5.) Mr. Black and Mr. Anderson walked to the cabin 
where Mr. Anderson was staying, which he also shared with Phil Wessler. (Supp. 
Tr., p.247, Ls.1-6; Supp. Tr. p.268, L.25 - p.269, L.6.) Mr. Wessler recalled being 
woken by the conversation Mr. Black and Mr. Anderson were having when they 
returned at approximately 11 :30. (Supp. Tr., p.270, Ls.5-13.) Mr. Wessler testified that 
he heard Mr. Black tell Mr. Anderson that SJM wanted Mr. Anderson to come to her 
trailer because she wanted to "hook up with him." (Supp. Tr., p.271, L.18 - p.272, L.10.) 
Mr. Wessler testified that Mr. Anderson said that sounded alright, but that he had no 
expectations for the evening. (Supp. Tr., p.272, Ls.16-19.) Mr. Anderson also testified 
that Mr. Black had told him SJM had ended her relationship with Mr. Prall and wanted to 
hang out with Mr. Anderson that night. (Supp. Tr., p.247, Ls.6-10.) Mr. Anderson 
testified that Mr. Black drove him up to SJM's trailer and they both went inside. 
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(Supp. Tr. p.248, Ls.1-23.) According to Mr. Anderson, Mr. Black left the trailer after 
seeing SJM awake. (Supp. Tr., p.249, L.12 - p.250, L.18.) 
The parties had been unable to locate Mr. Black before the trial. However, once 
he was finally located, Mr. Black gave testimony telephonically as part of the district 
court's consideration of Mr. Anderson's motion for a new trial. His testimony 
corroborated many of the major points of Mr. Anderson's version of events. For 
example, he also testified that SJM was upset over the breakup and asked Mr. Black to 
get Mr. Anderson to come talk to her. (Supp. Tr., p.319, L.17 - p.320, L.21.) He also 
testified that Mr. Anderson had stayed at the trailer after SJM had left, and Mr. Black 
encountered him there. (Supp. Tr., p.327, L.9 - p.328, L.2.) On other points, his 
memory differed from Mr. Anderson's. For example, he testified that SJM had passed 
out on the couch by the time he returned with Mr. Anderson, and Mr. Anderson was 
trying to wake her up when Mr. Black left the trailer. (Supp. Tr., p.326, Ls.5-8.) 
Mr. Black also corroborated Mr. Wessler's testimony about the conversation which took 
place in Mr. Anderson's cabin. (See Supp. Tr., p.324, Ls.11-15.) 
Mr. Anderson testified that, after Mr. Black had left, the situation turned sexual in 
nature and he and SJM began to have consensual intercourse. (Supp. Tr., p.250, 
L.23 - p.255, L.14.) However, Mr. Anderson testified that, during their encounter, 
SJM became upset. SJM is prescribed medication because she suffers from situational 
anxiety attacks related to post-traumatic stress disorder. (Supp. Tr., p.204, 
Ls.16 - p.205, L.14.) She had not taken the medication on the night in question. (Supp. 
Tr., p.204, Ls.18-19.) She began talking about being in a relationship with Mr. Prall, and 
then told Mr. Anderson that "they set you up." (Supp. Tr., p.255, L.15 - p.256, L.20.) At 
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that point, he got up and went into the bathroom, and when he returned, SJM was no 
longer in the room. (Supp. Tr., p.256, Ls.20-24.) 
SJM had gone over to the neighboring trailer, and she encountered her neighbor, 
Richard MacDuff. (Supp. Tr., p.160, L.20, p.165, Ls.20-21.) He testified that he left the 
bar around 12:30 and walked to his trailer. (Supp. Tr., p.160, Ls.8-10.) He did not hear 
anything out of the ordinary as he approached his trailer. (See Supp. Tr., p.160, 
Ls.15-16; see also Prelim. Tr. p.77, L.23 - p.78, L.15.) Shortly after he returned home, 
SJM came in wearing only a shirt, which had a few drops of blood on it, and was 
hysterical. (Supp. Tr., p.160, Ls.10-21, p.163, Ls.21-22.) Mr. Mays came out of his 
room, and SJM told them her version of the events. (See Supp. Tr., p.160, 11 - p.162, 
L.22.) 
According to SJM, she was asleep on one of the couches in her trailer. (Supp. 
Tr., p.179, Ls.22-23.) She said she woke up to find Mr. Anderson fondling himself at the 
end of the couch. (Supp. Tr., p.179, L.20 - p.180, L.10.) She said he then tried to take 
her pants off and she struggled against him. After getting the pants off, SJM claimed 
that he started having intercourse with her and she was screaming for help. (Supp. Tr., 
p.183, Ls.10-21.) She testified that Mr. Anderson punched her in the face each time 
she screamed, and that happened at least four times. (Supp. Tr., p.184, L.24 - p.185, 
L.9.) She testified that she struggled with him for some thirty to forty-five minutes, 
during which he penetrated her three times. (See Supp. Tr., p.186, Ls.10-24.) She 
stated that "he was just really brutal and really mean." (Supp. Tr., p.188, Ls.12-13.) 
According to her, he also bit her finger once. (Supp. Tr., p.188, L.24 - p.189, L.9.) 
Between that and the cut on her lip from the punching, she testified she was bleeding a 
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lot and got blood all over her blanket. (Supp. Tr., p.191, L.25 - p.192, L.1; Defense 
Exhibit B ·12:20.)3 She claimed she was able to get him to stop by telling him she 
was going to vomit, at which point she ran out of the trailer to the neighboring trailer. 
(Supp. Tr., p.190, Ls.16-22.) The route she took to the neighboring trailer took her 
through some foliage and bushes. (Supp. Tr., p.193, Ls.5-18.) It also took her across a 
patch of gravel which Officer Stanton Wiggins described as "pretty harsh" and "rough." 
(See Supp. Tr., p.42, L.10 - p.43, L.16.) Based on what SJM told them, Mr. Mays had 
SJM go into his room and lock the door, and told Mr. MacDuff to go call 911. As there 
was no phone available at the trailer, Mr. MacDuff went to the main lodge building, 
where he called the police. (Supp. Tr., p.162, L.23- p.163, L.4, p.164, Ls.15-19.) 
Officer Wiggins received the call out in response to Mr. MacDuff's 911 call at 
12:48. (Supp. Tr., p.126, L.10.) Mr. MacDuff waited for Officer Wiggins to respond, told 
him what was going on, and took him up to the trailer. (Supp. Tr., p.164, L.18 - p.165, 
L.3.) Officer Wiggins drove in his marked police vehicle. (Supp. Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14, 
L.1; Supp. Tr., p.71, Ls.21-25.) On the way, he saw Mr. Anderson, who was walking 
back down the road. (Supp. Tr., p.14, Ls.12-21.) 
Mr. Anderson had decided to wait in SJM's trailer for her to come back, putting 
on his clothes while doing so. (Supp. Tr., p.257, L.3 - p.258, L.12.) At that time, 
Mr. Black and Andy Hart, another lodge worker, came into the trailer and Mr. Black 
began to shout at Mr. Anderson. (Supp. Tr., p.258, Ls.7-24.) Mr. Hart attempted to 
quell the situation and told Mr. Anderson to go down to his cabin and wait for the police, 
who were on their way, and Mr. Anderson followed his advice. (Supp. Tr., p.258, 
3 Defense Exhibits A and B are audio recordings. Approximations of the time in the 
recording at which the relevant statements are provided where possible. 
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L.24 - p.259, L.6.) On his way back to his cabin, Officer Wiggins drove past him. 
(Supp. Tr., p.14, Ls.12-21.) Mr. Wessler testified that Mr. Anderson woke him upon 
returning to their cabin and told him what had happened. (Supp. Tr., p.273, Ls.7-14.) 
Mr. Wessler testified that Mr. Anderson said it was a consensual sexual encounter, then 
he had been confronted by the other employees, which had visibly shaken him. (Supp. 
Tr., p.273, Ls.7-14.) Mr. Wessler told Mr. Anderson to go lie down, get some sleep, and 
they would resolve the issue in the morning. (Supp. Tr., p.273, Ls.17-25.) 
Officer Wiggins continued up to the trailers, where he met with SJM. (Supp. 
Tr., p.15, Ls.1-8.) The recorded interview lasted only a few minutes. (See Defendant's 
Exhibit A (evidencing an eight-minute interview).) During that interview, SJM told 
Officer Wiggins that Mr. Anderson said some "Aryans" had told him to go up and take 
care of her. (Defense Exhibit A; Defense Exhibit B at 8:00; see also Supp. Tr., p.187, 
L.24 - p.188, L.1.) Mr. Anderson is of dark complexion and black ethnicity. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.1.) 
Officer Wiggins took pictures of SJM's noticeable injuries, which constituted a 
few cuts on her lips and an abrasion on her finger, none of which were bleeding at that 
time. (Supp. Tr., p.19, Ls.10-20; State's Exhibits 23-29.) She had told him that there 
was blood all over her blanket and the floor. (Defense Exhibit B at 12:20.) After 
interviewing her, Officer Wiggins released SJM to the EMTs to be transported to a 
medical facility in Missoula. 
Officer Wiggins then went to SJM's trailer and took a few pictures of the room. 
(Supp. Tr., p.29, L.10 - p.30, L.14; State's Exhibits 21-30, 34.) He did not inspect the 
floor for blood, and did not remember actually seeing any. (Supp. Tr., p.69, L.25 - p.70, 
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L.14.) He did not secure the scene or seize evidence there (such as the blanket). (See 
Tr., Vol.1, p.104, Ls.14-16; Supp. Tr., p.102, L.24 - p.103, L.12 (indicating he did not 
seize the blanket until a follow up investigation a week later).) He also did not follow 
up on his request for blood alcohol content (hereinafter, BAC) reports for either 
Mr. Anderson or SJM. (Supp. Tr., p.118, Ls.1-7.) In fact, the nurse who processed 
SJM in Missoula, Mary Pat Hansen, actually took blood and urine samples from SJM, 
but did not follow up on the results from those samples. (Supp. Tr., p.150, Ls.4-10.) 
After that investigation, he left to go interview Mr. Anderson. Mr. Wessler 
answered the door when Officer Wiggins arrived at the cabin, accompanied by two 
other deputies who Mr. Wessler identified as having been dispatched from Missoula. 
(Supp. Tr., p.275, Ls.11-15.) According to Mr. Wessler, Officer Wiggins was being very 
aggressive, and Mr. Wessler pointed him to Mr. Anderson. (Supp. Tr., p.275, 
L.24 - p.276, L.9.) Mr. Anderson had apparently taken Mr. Wessler's advice and gone 
to sleep. (See Supp. Tr., p.276, L.9.) Officer Wiggins went and woke Mr. Anderson up 
and began interrogating him. (Supp. Tr., p.276, Ls.8-13.) Mr. Wessler was present 
during Officer Wiggins's interrogation of Mr. Anderson. (Supp. Tr., p.276, Ls.14-18.) 
Mr. Wessler testified that Officer Wiggins was being "excessively aggressive" toward 
Mr. Anderson, "grill[ingJ him" as he was still waking up. (Supp. Tr., p.276, Ls.22-25.) 
Under this pressure, with Officer Wiggins's flashlight in his face, Mr. Anderson remained 
calm and cooperative. (Supp. Tr., p.276, L.25 - p.277, L.5.) 
As the questioning became more intense, Mr. Anderson stated that he wanted to 
talk with an attorney, a request that Mr. Wessler felt was appropriate in the situation. 
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(Supp. Tr., p.277, Ls.5-13.) When Mr. Anderson requested an attorney, Mr. Wessler 
testified: 
Officer Wiggins got extremely aggressive. Got right in Ron's face 
and started shouting at him. Basically kind of completely lost his cool. 
I was -- at that point I was sitting in the corner just kind of shocked, not 
knowing what was going on. Nothing had been said to any of us at this 
point. I didn't know charges. I didn't know why the police were there. 
And he [Officer Wiggins] kind of lost his cool. Shouted at Ron for a bit. 
After a few more minutes of that he decided to inform Ron that he was 
going to arrest him. There were no rights read. There was no mention of 
a charge. 
(Supp. Tr., p.277, Ls.14-25.) Mr. Wessler asked one of the Missoula deputies what was 
going on, and the deputy had him step outside, where he said they had been called in 
because of a complaint of rape. (Supp. Tr., p.278, Ls.1-7.) They both went back into 
the cabin, where Officer Wiggins was still questioning Mr. Anderson. (Supp. Tr., p.278, 
Ls.7-9.) Finally, Officer Wiggins, who "was definitely frustrated and still being very 
aggressive at that point" decided to take Mr. Anderson away, and told Mr. Anderson to 
put his pants on, but had to be told by Mr. Wessler that request was impossible while 
he left the handcuffs on Mr. Anderson. (Supp. Tr., p.278, Ls.9-19.) 
Finally, Officer Wiggins got the names of the various employees there, but failed 
to get permanent contact information for them, despite knowing many of them were 
temporary workers. (Supp. Tr., p.77, Ls.2-19.) That included people like Mr. Black, 
who left the Lodge shortly thereafter. (See, e.g., Supp. Tr., p.203, Ls.11-18.) Mr. Black 
could not be located in time for the trial. (See, e.g., R., p.97.) 
Virtually all the foregoing evidence was presented at Mr. Anderson's trial. (See 
generally Supp. Tr.) The district court then read several instructions to the jury. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.84, L.9 - p.90, L.25.) Those instructions had been discussed by the 
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parties, and were identified as Jury Instructions 10-20 (collectively, "post-proof 
instructions"). (Supp. Tr., p.111, L.12 -p.113, L.25.) Written copies of those 
instructions were provided to the jury. (Tr., Vol.1, p.87, Ls.21-22.) However, the 
instructions in the record constitute only instructions 1-9. (Supp. R., pp.16-38; 
November 29, 2012, Affidavit of Kathy Johnson.) 
The parties then made their closing arguments to the jury. ( See generally 
Tr., Vol.1, pp.91-126.) During those arguments, the prosecutor made several 
statements. In regard to the quality of the evidence he had presented, the prosecutor 
declared: 
I thought the nurse practitioner was very credible. 
I was a criminal defense attorney for 15 years. I've been a prosecutor for 
four years, and this in my -- this is some of the best evidence I've 
presented. 
I mean, my gosh, this is great evidence. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.96, L.25- p.97, L.1, p.120, Ls.14-16; p.123, Ls.7-8.) Additionally, in regard 
to defense counsel's tactical decisions, the prosecutor said: 
I found it interesting, too, that Mr. Dickison in his closing he hardly even 
mentioned Mr. Anderson's testimony .... He never -- he never talked to 
you about his client's version of the events except one or two times. 
Why? Because it's an unbelievable story. And it's uncredible, and it 
doesn't look good to stand up there and talk about his client's story, 
because he knows -- I would submit to you the reason is is [sic] because 
he knows it's not a good story. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.120, p.L.19 - p.121, L.6.) Finally, in regard to the defense presented, the 
prosecutor told the jury: 
You know, when the defense doesn't have -- when they have a defendant 
that comes up with an unbelievable story they've got to use smoke and 
mirrors. They've got to attack the State. 
12 
That story that Mr. Anderson told was so unbelievable and uncredible 
there was no reason to cross him. And I gladly ask you to bring your own 
common sense into this case, because if you do there's no way in the 
world you can believe Mr. Anderson's story. 
So to bring this out -- again, when you don't have a good story to tell, and 
Mr. Anderson has had a long time to come up with a good story, and that 
was a terrible story. I'm surprised he didn't come up with anything better. 
And you've got to come up with something. If you're the defense, what do 
you do? You've got to attack. You can't just sit back and say nothing. 
You've got to come up with some story. 
That's a ridiculous argument. But, again, you've got to come up with 
something. 
[l]t's an unbelievable story. 
[T]he defense -- they want to come up with stories how they [the injuries] 
happened some way else -- happened some other way. . . . And they 
come up with these stories that are not believable, but yet they throw them 
out to you and want you to believe them. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.117, Ls.7-10, p.117, Ls.14-19, p.118, Ls.19-23, p.120, Ls.16-19, p.121, 
Ls.17-25, p.121, L.2, p.123, Ls.2-7.) After hearing all these statements,4 the 
jury convicted Mr. Anderson. (R., p.68.) The district court told counsel that, "I was 
shocked by this verdict." (Tr., Vol.1, p.146, Ls.1-2.) The district court's statement was 
made in response to Mr. Anderson's motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
and for a new trial, was premised on the sloppy police work and that SJM's version of 
events was not corroborated. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.146, L.25 - p.147, 13.) As such, when it 
heard Mr. Black's testimony, presented in support of Mr. Anderson's motion for a new 
trial, the district court granted that motion. (R., pp.95-108.) 
4 All of those statements except the prosecutor's comment on the credibility of Nurse 
Hansen, occurred in the prosecutor's rebuttal statements. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.117, 
Ls.3-6) 
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When the case was remanded following the State's appeal of that decision, 
which resulted in a reversal of the order granting a new trial, the district court proceeded 
to sentence Mr. Anderson. The prosecutor recommended that the district court execute 
a unified sentence of seven to ten years, without a recommendation regarding the fixed 
portion of such a sentence. (Tr., Vol.2, p.10, Ls.8-9.) Defense counsel recommended a 
period of retained jurisdiction, with the underlying sentence left to the district court's 
discretion. (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, Ls.17-20.) The district court, however, executed a unified 
term of eighteen years, with nine years fixed. (R., pp.161-62.) Mr. Anderson filed a 
timely appeal from that decision. (R., pp.164-65.) 
On appeal, Mr. Anderson argued that the district court erred by failing to preserve 
the post-proof jury instructions in the record, thereby depriving him of his constitutional 
right to due process, and that his conviction should be vacated because of a variety of 
prosecutorial misconduct. He also argued that the accumulation of these errors 
deprived him of a fair trial. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no error in the failure to preserve 
the written post-proof jury instructions because Mr. Anderson could not say what 
specific prejudice arose from those written instructions. (Opinion, pp.3-6.) In regard to 
the prosecutorial misconduct argument, the Court of Appeals determined that, while 
some of the prosecutor's statements did constitute misconduct, Mr. Anderson had failed 
to show prejudice under the fundamental error test, and therefore, the misconduct did 
not justify vacating his sentence. (Opinion, pp.6-18.) For that same reason, it found 
that he had not demonstrated two errors to trigger the cumulative error doctrine. 
(Opinion, pp.18-19.) Mr. Anderson filed a timely petition for review. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Anderson's Judgment 
of Conviction is in conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court 
and the Idaho Court of Appeals in its resolution of both of Mr. Anderson's claims 
of error. 
2. Whether the district court erred by failing to preserve the post-proof jury 
instructions in the record, thus depriving Mr. Anderson of his right to due process. 
3. Whether Mr. Anderson's conviction should be vacated because of prosecutorial 
misconduct by vouching for evidence, misstating the law, disparaging the 
defense, and commenting on the veracity of Mr. Anderson's testimony. 
4. Whether the accumulation of errors in this case deprived Mr. Anderson of a fair 
trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Anderson's Judgment Of Conviction 
Is In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The Idaho Supreme Court And The Idaho 
Court Of Appeals In Its Resolution Of Both Of Mr. Anderson's Claims Of Error 
A Standard For Evaluating Petitions For Review 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted 
only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the 
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the 
Supreme Court. I.AR. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered. 
Rule 11 B(b) provides some factors which must be considered in evaluating any petition 
for review, including: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from 
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court; and 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior 
decisions. 
I.AR. 11 S(b). In this case, Mr. Anderson contends that there are special and important 
reasons for review to be granted. Specifically, the Court of Appeals' analysis on both 
issues raised is in contravention of Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 
precedent. I.AR. 118(b)(2)-(3). Therefore, this Court should exercise its review 
authority in this case. 
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B. The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Requiring Mr. Anderson To Show Specific 
Prejudice Arising From The Failure To Preserve A Copy Of The Written Post-
Proof Jury Instructions Is Directly Contrary To Existing Precedent 
The Court of Appeals did recognize that the written instructions may be 
erroneous. (Opinion, p.4.) This Court has consistently considered those written 
instructions to be "an essential part of the record on appeal." Upham, 14 P .2d at 1102; 
I.C.R. 30(b). The Court of Appeals has recognized the same, noting that "without a 
copy of the proposed jury instruction this Court would be without sufficient information to 
evaluate [the propriety of the jury instructions]." Walsh, 141 Idaho at 877. As a result, 
this Court consistently held that a defendant is deprived of his fundamental right to due 
process in these sort of situations because he is deprived of the opportunity to establish 
facts demonstrating the legality or illegality of the proceedings. See, e.g., Walters, 120 
Idaho at 51; Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50; Ebersole, 91 Idaho at 636. 
In direct contradiction to this precedent, the Court of Appeals held that, because 
Mr. Anderson had not pointed to "specific prejudice arising from the missing jury 
instructions" there was no violation of his constitutional right. (Opinion, p.6.) It relies on 
the fact that Mr. Anderson was only able to assert that there may have been errors in 
the presentation of the written instructions.5 In doing so, the Court of Appeals' opinion 
5 The Court of Appeals also relies on the fact that Mr. Anderson was represented by 
counsel throughout the proceedings, including the jury instruction phase, and no 
assertions of error were made. (Opinion, p.6.) That conclusion, however, does not 
actually address the concern raised by this claim. Mr. Anderson is claiming that the 
district court has deprived him of due process by not maintaining a copy of the written 
post-proof instructions. As the Court of Appeals itself has held, without a copy of the 
proposed jury instruction this Court would be without sufficient information to evaluate 
[the propriety of the jury instructions]." Walsh, 141 Idaho at 877. The impact of this 
error is far-reaching, since if there was error and his attorney failed to raise that 
question to the district court, Mr. Anderson would be unable to vindicate a claim of 
ineffective assistance in post-conviction because the court would be without sufficient 
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establishes a Catch-22: in order to demonstrate reversible error, defendant-appellants 
must be able to articulate specific prejudice arising from a document which will not be 
made available to them until they articulate that specific prejudice. 
Because the Catch-22 is the result of such logic, it becomes clear why this Court 
has previously determined that a written copy of the instructions must be included in the 
appellate record. See, e.g., State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 589-92 (2011). In Draper, 
for example, this Court found reversible error based on the format in which the 
instructions had been written; the language used was proper and reflected the relevant 
statute. Id. The reason that the format of the instructions is so critical is that, if the 
jurors have questions about the law during their deliberations, they are expected to use 
the written instructions to help answer the questions. See id. at 590-91; State v. Amelia, 
144 Idaho 332, 334-35 (Ct. App. 2007). If the format of those instructions is erroneous, 
then the deliberations have been impacted. 
Furthermore, such an error will only ever be evident by reviewing a copy of the 
written instructions. However, if the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case is correct, 
than such errors will never be corrected when the written instructions are not preserved, 
as defendants in Mr. Anderson's position will be unable to allege specific prejudice 
arising from erroneously-formatted instructions because they will not have a copy of the 
instructions upon which to base such a claim. To ensure that such injustice does not 
information to evaluate the propriety of counsel's actions. The district court's failure, 
then, deprives Mr. Anderson of the opportunity to establish any claims relating to the 
jury instructions given in his trial, and therefore, has been deprived of due process by 
the district court's failing. See, e.g., Walters, 120 Idaho at 51; Martinez, 92 Idaho at 
149-50; Ebersole, 91 Idaho at 636. Therefore, this observation by the district court does 
not help resolve the question at issue. 
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occur, this Court has held that, where a record "might have substantiated" the allegation 
of error, there is a due process violation. Walters, 120 Idaho at 51 (emphasis added). 
Ultimately, this Court's precedent over the last forty years has held that the 
district court's failure to preserve the record for review is, in and of itself, a violation of 
the defendant's due process rights. See, e.g., Zielinski, 119 Idaho at 318; Martinez, 92 
Idaho at 149-50; Ebersole, 91 Idaho at 636. The Opinion in this case departs from that 
precedent, requiring the defendant to first show the error that exists in the unpreserved 
record. See Opinion, pp.5-6. Since the Opinion is inconsistent with this Court's 
precedent, as well as its own precedent, this Court should exercise its review authority 
in this case. 
C. The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Improperly Concluded That The Several 
Instances Of Prosecutorial Misconduct Were Individually And Collectively 
Harmless 
First, and critically, in the Respondent's Brief, the State offered no argument in 
regard to harmlessness. (See generally Resp. Br.) As a result, Mr. Anderson argued, 
under this Court's recent decision in Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 600-01, that the State had 
failed to meet its burden in that regard and, therefore, the error could not be considered 
harmless. (Reply Br., pp.15-16.) The Court of Appeals did not address this issue at all 
in the Opinion. Therefore, the Opinion in this case does not comport with this Court's 
determination of the proper standards for review and, therefore, this Court should 
exercise its review authority in that regard. 
On the merits of the arguments presented, the Court of Appeals found at least 
two instances of prosecutorial misconduct in this case: misstating the burden of proof, 
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and improper vouching for the State's evidence.6 Opinion, pp.8, 12-13. Specifically, as 
to the vouching, the Court of Appeals determined that the following two comments were 
"clearly misconduct": "I thought the nurse practitioner was very credible. I think she 
adds credence to the State's case," and "I was a criminal defense attorney for 15 years. 
I've been a prosecutor for four years, and this in my--this is some of the best evidence 
I've presented."7 (Opinion, pp.12-13.) In regard to the burden of proof, the Court of 
Appeals would not "condone" the following statements: 
[T]he prosecutor told the jury that defense counsel was "just doing his job, 
but his job is to try to make you believe there's no evidence here, and 
there's more than substantial evidence to find Mr. Anderson guilty." The 
next statement occurred after the prosecutor told the jury he was a 
criminal defense attorney for fifteen years and had been a prosecutor for 
four years, and that "this is some of the best evidence I've 
presented." The prosecutor then stated: "And you've got to come up with 
something. If you're the defense, what do you do? You've got to attack. 
You can't just sit back and say nothing. You've got to come up with some 
story." 
(Opinion, p.8.) Therefore, the question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that 
the misconduct impacted the jury's deliberations; if it did, then the error prejudiced 
6 Mr. Anderson argued that several other statements by the prosecutor also constituted 
misconduct, but the Court of Appeals found them to be permissible. See generally 
Opinion, pp.6-18. For the reasons set forth in Section 111, infra, Mr. Anderson contends 
that the Court of Appeals conclusions in those regards was also erroneous; those 
statements constituted misconduct. Therefore, that error in the Opinion further 
demonstrates why this Court should exercise its review authority in this case. 
7 The prosecutor actually made a second statement of this same kind: "I mean, my 
gosh, this is great evidence." (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.123, Ls.7-8.) The Court of 
Appeals, however, decided that this comment could simply refer to the breadth of the 
evidence presented by the State (despite the use of the adjective "great," which clearly 
describes the evidence as "markedly superior in character," MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S 
DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 355 (2007), thereby vouching for its weight) and so, did not 
consider it in the prejudice calculation. (Opinion, p.13.) However, since the statement 
obviously speaks to the value and weight of the evidence, it should be considered 
alongside the prosecutor's other statement, that this was "the best evidence" he had 
ever presented. 
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Mr. Anderson and his resulting conviction needs to be vacated. State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 220 (2010); State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476,479 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied. 
The district court made it clear on the record that the evidence in this case was 
not, in its opinion, overwhelming, that the case turned on credibility determinations. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.146, Ls.1-2; Tr., Vol.1, p.146, L.25 - p.147, L.13.) The Court of Appeals 
expressly disagreed with the district court's conclusions on this point. Opinion, pp.16-17 
(quoting State v. Anderson, Docket Number 36319, Court of Appeals 2010 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 610, p.5 (wherein the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order 
granting a new trial based on newly-available testimony)). Based only on its view of that 
evidence, the Court of Appeals decided that there was no reasonable possibility that the 
misconduct affected the verdict. 
However, the very nature of that dispute shows that reasonable minds could 
differ on the interpretation of the evidence presented in this case. As this Court has 
previously stated: "'[w]here the issue of guilt is debatable or it appears from the record 
that the jurors could have reasonably entertained doubt as to the defendant's guilt and 
that misconduct of the prosecuting attorney might well have influenced the result, a 
conviction will be reversed."' Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111 (quoting Spencer, 74 Idaho at 
184).8 As such, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that there was no reasonable 
possibility that the misconduct impacted the deliberations is not proper. Given the 
possibility that the jurors were of like mind with the district court, there is a reasonable 
possibility the prosecutor's misconduct in making statements about the strength and 
8 While Garcia and Spencer predate Perry's reformation of the fundamental error 
doctrine, their rationale is still valid. Compare Day, 154 Idaho at 479. It demonstrates 
how a defendant is prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct. 
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reliability of the evidence, swayed them to convict Mr. Anderson. In fact, the Ninth 
Circuit has pointed out, "When credibility of witnesses is crucial, improper vouching is 
particularly likely to jeopardize the fundamental fairness of the trial." United 
States v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915,921 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). 
Given that the sequence of events in this case is highly disputed, specifically, 
whether SJM invited Mr. Anderson to visit her trailer and whether the sexual intercourse 
was consensual, this is the type of case where the testimony of witnesses is crucial. 
The Court says there is no question in this regard because SJM's version of events was 
supported by other evidence. (Opinion, p.18.) That ignores the evidence contradicting 
her version of events, discussed in depth infra, and the evidence supporting 
Mr. Anderson's version of events. Just because the Court of Appeals, in its own 
consideration of the evidence, has decided to believe SJM over Mr. Anderson does not 
mean that all the jurors initially did so. Rather, the case turns on which witnesses the 
jury believes. Therefore, these comments infringed on Mr. Anderson's constitutional 
right to a fair trial because there is a reasonable possibility that they influenced the 
verdict. See, e.g., State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 368-69 (Ct. App. 201 O); Edwards, 
154 F.3d at 921. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals conclusion regarding the prejudice caused by 
the misconduct, based only on its disagreement with the district court on the 
assessment of the evidence in this case, is directly contradictory to this Court's 
precedent. As such, this Court should exercise its review authority. After all, as Judge 
Kozinski recently pointed out, "When a public official behaves with such casual 
disregard for his constitutional obligations and the rights of the accused, it erodes the 
22 
public's trust in our justice system, and chips away the foundational premises of the 
rule of law. When such transgressions are acknowledged yet forgiven by the courts, we 
endorse and invite their repetition." United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 632 (2013) 
(order denying appellant's petition for rehearing) (Kozinksi, C.J., dissenting). 
D. The Court Of Appeals Failed To Properly Apply The Cumulative Error Doctrine, 
Either To The Multiple Statements Constituting Misconduct Or To All The Errors 
In The Case As A Whole 
The Court of Appeals simply concluded that, because it found that none of the 
errors independently prejudiced Mr. Anderson under the fundamental error analysis, he 
had "failed to demonstrate at least two errors, a necessary predicate to the application 
of our cumulative error doctrine." (Opinion, pp.18-19.) Essentially, the Court of Appeals 
has held that, because the errors were individually harmless, they are not errors for the 
purpose of the cumulative error doctrine. This analysis misapplies the cumulative error 
test. See, e.g., Martinez, 125 Idaho at 453; Paciorek, 137 Idaho at 635; Vandenacre, 
131 Idaho at 513. The point of the cumulative error test is to evaluate the prejudice 
caused by multiple errors, when separately, they do not sufficiently demonstrate 
prejudice. Besides, as discussed in Section l(C), supra, the Court of Appeals 
acknowledged two errors. Therefore, its conclusion that there were not two errors is not 
even consistent with the rest of the opinion, much less with established precedent. 
Therefore, this further evidences why this Court should exercise its review authority in 
this case. 
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II. 
The District Court Erred By Failing To Preserve The Post-Proof Jury Instructions In The 
Record, Thus Depriving Mr. Anderson Of His Right To Due Process 
A. Introduction 
The district court did not preserve a copy of the written post-proof instructions 
which were provided to the jury for use during its deliberations in this case. Because 
reversible error can be found either in the language used in the written instructions, 
even in light of recorded oral instructions, or in the manner in which the written 
instructions present the information to the jury, a copy of those written instructions is 
an essential element of the record for appeal. The district court's failure to preserve an 
adequate record in that regard deprives a defendant of his due process rights. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction and remand his case for 
a new trial. 
B. By Not Preserving A Sufficient Record For Appeal, The District Court Violated 
Mr. Anderson's Due Process Rights 
It is well recognized that, in order to provide a defendant-appellant with due 
process, the State must afford him a sufficient appellate record. Draper v. Washington, 
372 U.S. 487, 498 (1963); see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). A sufficient 
record is one that allows for an adequate review of the proceedings below for errors. 
See State v. Morgan, _ P.3d _, Docket No. 39057, at 2 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002)), petition for rev. denied. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has consistently held that, when the inadequate appellate record 
is caused by the district court's failure to maintain an adequate record below, that 
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violates the defendant-appellant's due process rights by depriving the proceedings 
of the necessary fundamental fairness. See, e.g., State v. Zielinski, 119 Idaho 316,318 
(1991); State v. Martinez, 92 Idaho 148, 149-50 (1968); Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho 
630, 636 (1967). 
One reason why such a failure constitutes a due a process violation is, "where 
pertinent portions of the record are missing, they are presumed to support the actions 
of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted). 
Furthermore, without the written jury instructions, the appellate courts have insufficient 
evidence to find error with the instructions. State v. Walsh, 141 Idaho 870, 877 
(Ct. App. 2005). As a result of this presumption, where the written instructions are not 
preserved in the record, the defendant-appellant is prevented from challenging those 
instructions for error. See id. Therefore, in order to have an adequate review of the jury 
instructions, all the written instructions need to be maintained in the record, or else the 
defendant-appellant is deprived of his constitutional right to due process. See, e.g., 
Draper, 372 U.S. at 498; Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19; Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50; Ebersole, 
91 Idaho at 636. 
Historically, the written jury instructions were "an essential part of the record on 
appeal." State v. Upham, 52 Idaho 340, _, 14 P.2d 1101, 1102 (1932). They are still 
an essential part of the record because all written instructions are required to be 
delivered to the jury when it retires for deliberation. I.C.R. 30(b). As such, if a question 
arises as to the applicable law, the jurors will refer back to the written instructions, and if 
those written instructions contain an error, the jury could reach an inappropriate 
conclusion. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has recognized that simply recording 
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the oral recitation of the instructions is insufficient to prevent all such prejudice, as the 
oral recitation may deviate from the written instructions, causing prejudice to the 
defendant. See State v. Amelia, 144 Idaho 332, 336 (Ct. App. 2007). Such was the 
case in Amelia, even though the written instruction provided to the jury was a correct 
statement of the law. Id. at 334-36. 
In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court has found error where the manner in which 
the instructions are presented is inappropriate, even though the language of the 
instruction parrots the relevant statute. See Draper, 151 Idaho at 589-92 (holding that 
an instruction regarding conspiracy (which parroted the language of the relevant statute) 
was nevertheless erroneous because the way in which it listed one of the essential 
elements of the crime could cause it to be reasonably read as an alternate theory, 
rather than a free-standing element, thus impermissibly reducing the burden of proof on 
the state, an error which required vacation of the conviction on that charge). Therefore, 
in order to allow for an adequate review of the jury instructions-both the language used 
and the manner in which it presented the instructions-the written copy sent with the 
jury needs to be preserved in the record. See id.; Amelia, 144 Idaho at 336. 
Such a review cannot happen without a preserved copy of the instructions 
because, "[g]enerally, without a copy of the ... instruction this Court would be without 
sufficient information to evaluate whether [it] was an erroneous statement of the law, 
adequately covered by other instructions, or not supported by the facts of the case." 
Walsh, 141 Idaho at 877; see also Amelia, 144 Idaho at 336; United States v. Wander, 
601 F.2d 1251, 1262-63 (3rd Cir. 1979). As such, a failure to maintain a copy of all the 
written instructions given to the jury deprives the defendant of an adequate record for 
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review, and thus, his due process rights. See, e.g., Draper, 372 U.S. at 498; Griffin, 351 
U.S. at 19; Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50; Ebersole, 91 Idaho at 636. 
In this case, the district court failed to preserve the written copy of the post-proof 
instructions that was provided to the jury. (Compare Supp. R., pp.16-38 (according to 
the November 29, 2012, Affidavit of Kathy Johnson, this is the entire collection of 
instructions which were preserved in the record, and they stop at number 9) with Supp. 
Tr., p.111, L.12 - p.113, L.25 Uury instruction conference discussing instructions 10-20 
and the verdict form) and Tr., Vol.1, p.87, Ls.21-22 (indicating written copies of the 
instructions were prepared for the jury).) By failing to preserve a written copy of the 
post-proof instructions, the district court deprived Mr. Anderson of an adequate 
appellate record and violated his due process rights. 
The fact that he cannot review the language in those instructions or the manner 
in which it was presented demonstrates prejudice. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
consistently held that, when the inadequate appellate record is caused by the district 
court's failure to maintain an adequate record below, abstract prejudice constitutes 
constitutional error. See, e.g., Martinez, 92 Idaho at 149-50; Ebersole, 91 Idaho at 636; 
State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 51 (1990); Zielinski, 119 Idaho at 318. For example, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has clearly held that, where a sufficient record was unavailable, 
"but had a record been available it might have substantiated the defendant's allegation 
that there was prejudicial error in those proceedings," the judgment of conviction based 
on the missing portions of the record cannot stand. Walters, 120 Idaho at 51 (emphasis 
added). According to Walters, the defendant-appellant is entitled to relief if there is only 
a chance that there was error; he need not show actual prejudice. See id. 
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Therefore, his conviction should be vacated and the case remanded for a new 
trial. See, e.g., Walters, 120 Idaho at 51; Draper, 151 Idaho at 592; Amelia, 144 Idaho 
at 336. 
111. 
Mr. Anderson's Conviction Should Be Vacated Because Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
By Vouching For Evidence, Misstating The Law, Disparaging The Defense, And 
Commenting On The Veracity Of Mr. Anderson's Testimony 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Anderson contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his case 
which abridged his constitutional rights to due process of law and to a fair trial. See 
U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; IDAHO CONST., art. I § 13While a prosecutor can commit 
misconduct in numerous ways, the misconduct in this case manifested as improper 
vouching for evidence, misstating the evidence and shifting the burden of proof, and 
disparaging the defense, defense counsel, or defense theory. Where such conduct 
does deprive a defendant of those rights, as it did in this case, it constitutes 
fundamental error, which is not necessarily harmless. Because the prosecutor's 
misconduct in this case rose to that level, this Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's 
conviction, obtained via the prosecutor's misconduct. 
B. The Events Of Prosecutorial Misconduct In This Case Constituted Fundamental 
Error As They Violated His Unwaived Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial And 
Were Clear From The Record 
Prosecutorial misconduct manifests itself in many forms. For example, it can be 
in the form of "appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of 
inflammatory tactics." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86-87 (Ct. App. 2007) (listing 
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various unacceptable ways in which a prosecutor can commit misconduct). Such 
statements are not permissible at trial. Id. The United States and Idaho Supreme 
Courts have both condemned the prosecuting attorney's interjection of his personal 
opinions during a criminal case. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 
(1985); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 753 (1991); overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,432 (1991). In fact, these rules against misconduct: 
apply most stringently to a prosecuting attorney, [because] prosecutors 
too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that 
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give 
more credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of 
the trial and in the presence of a jury than they will give to counsel for the 
accused. It seems they frequently exert their skill and ingenuity to see 
how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in doing 
so they transgress upon the rights of the accused. 
Phillips, 144 Idaho at 88 (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903)). As such, 
where the prosecutor does violate this rule and the appellate court "cannot conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's impermissible comments ... did not 
contribute to the jury's verdict," the case needs to be remanded for a new trial. 
State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 641 (Ct. App. 2011). 
When the defense fails to object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, it is subject 
to analysis under the fundamental error doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 220 (2010). To show fundamental error in regard to claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct, the appellate court engages in a three-step review, determining: 
"(1) whether misconduct occurred; (2) whether the alleged misconduct rose to the level 
of fundamental error; and (3) whether the misconduct was harmless." Id. at 219. 
To determine whether the errors were fundamental, the appellate court considers 
whether "(1) [the error] violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
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rights; (2) the error is clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome 
of the trial proceedings." State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 562 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226). "The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments 
'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of 
due process."' State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718-19 (2011) (quoting 
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (in turn quoting Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974))). To that end, statements constituting 
prosecutorial misconduct violate the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 
Betancourt, 151 Idaho at 640; see State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715-16 (2008). In 
this case, the prosecutor's many instances of misconduct meet that standard, constitute 
fundamental error, and impermissibly tainted the conviction. As such, this Court should 
vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction and remand for a new trial. 
1. By Vouching For The State's Evidence, The Prosecutor Committed 
Misconduct, Justifying Vacating Mr. Anderson's Sentence 
One way a prosecutor can commit misconduct is by vouching during his closing 
arguments for the credibility of the evidence he presented. State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 
364, 368 (Ct. App. 2010). A prosecutor improperly vouches for evidence when he puts 
the prestige of the state behind that evidence, expressing his personal opinions or 
beliefs about the quality of that evidence. Id.; see also State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 
111 (1979); Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 753. However, both sides are allowed, as a matter of 
general policy, to discuss their respective standpoints and the inferences they have 
drawn therefrom. State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 69 (Ct. App. 1998). Three times in this 
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case, the prosecutor departed from such permissible conduct and committed 
misconduct by affirtmatively vouching for the evidence he had presented. 
First, the prosecutor declared: a. "I was a criminal defense attorney for 15 years. 
I've been a prosecutor for four years, and this in my -- this is some of the best evidence 
I've presented." (Tr., Vol.1, p.120, Ls.14-16.) This statement takes the prestige of the 
State ("I've been a prosecutor for four years"), in addition to the prosecutor's reputation 
("I was a criminal defense attorney for 15 years"), and used both to promote the 
credibility of the evidence the State presented at trial ("this is some of the best evidence 
I've presented"). That sort of conduct by a prosecutor is expressly prohibited. Wheeler, 
149 Idaho at 368. 
The prosecutor continued, "the defense -- they want to come up with stories how 
they [SJM's injuries] happened some way else -- happened some other way .... And 
they come up with these stories that are not believable, but yet they throw them out to 
you and want you to believe them. I mean, my gosh, this is great evidence." (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.123, Ls.2-8 (emphasis added).) By again offering his opinion as to the credibility of 
the evidence, the prosecutor again committed misconduct. Garcia, 100 Idaho at 111; 
Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 753. 
Finally, the prosecutor told the jury outright, "I thought the nurse practitioner was 
very credible." (Tr., Vol.1, p.96, L.25 - p.97, L.1.) This is a textbook example of 
vouching, and thus, prosecutorial misconduct. Wheeler, 149 Idaho at 369 ("Closing 
argument should not include counsel's personal opinions and beliefs about the 
credibility of a witness .... "). 
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The prosecutor also vouched against the evidence Mr. Anderson presented. For 
example, the prosecutor told the jury, "to bring this out -- again, when you don't have a 
good story to tell, and Mr. Anderson has had a long time to come up with a good story, 
and that was a terrible story. I'm surprised he didn't come up with anything better." 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.118, Ls.19-23 (emphasis added).) Again, "[t]hat story that Mr. Anderson 
told was so unbelievable and uncredible [sic] there was no reason to cross him. And I 
gladly ask you to bring your own common sense into this case, because if you do 
there's no way in the world you can believe Mr. Anderson's story." (Tr., Vol.1, p.117, 
Ls.14-19 (emphasis added).) And again, "[defense counsel] never-- he never talked to 
you about his client's version of the events except one or two times. Why? Because it's 
an unbelievable story." (Tr., Vol.1, p.120, L.19 - p.121, L.6 (emphasis added).) In each 
of these statements, the prosecutor vouched that Mr. Anderson's testimony was not 
believable. These violations are clear from the record, satisfying the first two aspects 
of the Perry test. 
2. By Misstating The Law In Regard To The Burden Of Proof At The Trial, 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Justifying Vacating 
Mr. Anderson's Sentence 
A prosecutor may also commit misconduct by misrepresenting the law or the 
reasonable doubt burden of proof during his closing argument. Phillips, 144 Idaho 
at 86. Such errors have traditionally been considered to be fundamental in Idaho 
"because it would go to the foundation of the case and would take from [the defendant] 
a right which is essential to his defense." State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 
(1993); State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 910 (Ct. App. 2010). As such, comments or 
instructions which shift the "burden of persuasion on an essential element" are 
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erroneous. State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942 (2008); abrogated on other grounds by 
Verksa v. St. Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011). Ultimately, the 
prosecutor may not make comments which indicate the defendant has a responsibility 
to present evidence in his defense. See, e.g., State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 482 
(2012), reh'g denied (noting in that case, "the prosecution never stated that Adamcik 
had the responsibility to test the evidence .... ") 
To determine whether such a violation has occurred, the appellate courts must 
carefully scrutinize the actual words used and the way in which a reasonable juror could 
interpret those words. Mubita, 145 Idaho at 942. If the words the prosecutor uses, as 
they could be reasonably interpreted, "diminish[ ] or distort[ ]" the State's burden, then 
the prosecutor has committed misconduct. State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 
(Ct. App. 2010). 
In this case, the prosecutor made two statements which told the jury that the 
defense had to present evidence or offer a theory of the crime: first, he told the jury, 
"[a]nd you've got to come up with something. If you're the defense, what do you do? 
You've got to attack. You can't just sit back and say nothing. You've got to come up 
with some story." (Tr., Vol.1, p.120, 16-19.) He continued, "[t]hat's a ridiculous 
argument. But, again, you've got to come up with something." (Tr., Vol.1, p.121, 
Ls.17-25.) A reasonable jury would interpret those arguments to mean that, in the 
absence of a good defense, it could convict even if the State failed to actually prove the 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. That diminishes the State's burden to prove 
Mr. Anderson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, constitutes misconduct. 
See Mubita, 145 Idaho at 942; Erickson, 148 Idaho at 685. 
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Those statements also do not accurately reflect the state of the law, because the 
defendant is never required to "come up with something." Cf., Brooks v. Tennessee, 
406 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1972) (holding a defendant need not disclose whether he intends 
to testify or offer defense witnesses before trial because he cannot be sure until after 
the State has presented its evidence whether such testimony will be necessary or 
helpful to his case); State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 627 (Ct. App. 2011) (declaring 
that neither direct nor indirect comments on the defendant's failure to present evidence 
through his own testimony are permissible). This also impermissibly alters the burden 
of proof because it would force the defendant to prove his innocence in light of the 
evidence presented by the State. 
The only exception to this fundamental premise is if the prosecutor's comment is 
limited to the defense's failure to produce material evidence or call a logical witness. 
Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 482 (holding that statements that "[the defense] could have 
tested the other shirt, the other pair of gloves, and all the other items that were in 
evidence. And they chose not to do that," to be permissible); Mendoza, 151 Idaho at 
627 (holding that statements like "[s]he kept the envelope, crumpled up and put it in her 
purse, but where is that evidence now? She hasn't produced it," to be permissible). 
However, in this case, the prosecutor did not comment on a particular piece of evidence 
or particular testimony that Mr. Anderson did not present. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.120, 16-19, 
p.121, Ls.17-25.) Rather, like in Erickson, it asserted that he needed to refute the 
evidence in general, which is an incorrect statement of the law. See Erickson, 158 
Idaho at 685-86 (holding that statements like "but there is also a downside to it. I can't 
bring you the perfect case. There will always be the possibility there," are sufficient to 
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impermissibly alter the burden of proof (emphasis in original)). These violations are 
clear from the record, satisfying the first two aspects of the Perry test. 
3. By Disparaging The Defense And Its Theory Of The Case, The Prosecutor 
Committed Misconduct, Justifying Vacating Mr. Anderson's Sentence 
Another way in which a prosecutor can commit misconduct is by "mak[ing] 
personal attacks on defense counsel in closing argument." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 
15, 19 (Ct. App. 2008); see also State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003); 
Young, 470 U.S. at 8-9 & n.7. By the same token, a prosecutor can also commit 
misconduct if he disparages or distorts the defense presented. See, e.g., 
State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576 (2007); see also Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87 (finding 
misconduct where the prosecutor invited the jury to feel "irritated" by the defense 
presented). 
The prosecutor made several such impermissible comments in this case, 
disparaging both defense counsel and the defense theory. In regard to defense 
counsel's decisions in his representation of Mr. Anderson, the prosecutor said: 
I found it interesting, too, that [defense counsel] in his closing he hardly 
even mentioned Mr. Anderson's testimony. . . . He never -- he never 
talked to you about his client's version of the events except one or two 
times. Why? Because it's an unbelievable story. And it's uncredible, and 
it doesn't look good to stand up there and talk about his client's story, 
because he knows -- I would submit to you the reason is is [sic] because 
he knows it's not a good story. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.120, L.19 - p.121 L.6.) Like in Sheahan and Gross, these comments which 
suggest that defense counsel has knowingly elicited false testimony constitutes 
misconduct. See Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280; Gross, 146 Idaho at 19. 
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jury: 
Furthermore, in regard to Mr. Anderson's defense theory, the prosecutor told the 
So to bring this out -- again, when you don't have a good story to tell, and 
Mr. Anderson has had a long time to come up with a good story, and that 
was a terrible story. I'm surprised he didn't come up with anything better. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.118, Ls.19-23 (emphasis added).) Moments later, the prosecutor 
improperly declared: "That's a ridiculous argument. But, again, you've got to come up 
with something." (Tr., Vol.1, p.121, Ls.17-25.) He continued: "And you've got to come 
up with something. If you're the defense, what do you do? You've got to attack. You 
can't just sit back and say nothing. You've got to come up with some story." (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.120, 16-19.) And finally, "You know, when the defense doesn't have -- when they 
have a defendant that comes up with an unbelievable story they've got to use smoke 
and mirrors. They've got to attack the State." (Tr., Vol.1, p.117, Ls.7-10.) Time and 
again during his closing remarks, the prosecutor disparaged the defense presented and 
the means by which it was presented. These statements are impermissible. See, e.g., 
Gross, 146 Idaho at 19; Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576. These violations are clear from the 
record, satisfying the first two aspects of the Perry test. 
C. The Individual Errors Were Not Harmless In This Case 
As the district court stated during the hearing on Mr. Anderson's motion for a new 
trial, it felt that this case was very close to resulting in an acquittal: "I have to say I was 
shocked by this verdict. ... Let me tell you the two things that bother me most about 
this case was the really sloppy police work ... [and] there was one impartial witness ... 
contradict[ing] everything [the victim] had to say." (Tr., Vol.1, p.146, Ls.1-2; Tr., Vol.1, 
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p.146, L.25 - p.147, L.13.) While the independent witness referred to was not able to be 
located before the trial, the district court's comments reveal how close the case was. 
As to SJM's testimony, its reliability was called into question by the other 
evidence in the record. For example, there was an absence of injuries to SJM's vaginal 
area. (Supp. Tr., p.144, Ls.6-7.) This is highly probative because she testified that she 
was trying to fight off Mr. Anderson, who was being "really brutal," and get away to the 
door for thirty to forty-five minutes. (See Supp. Tr., p.185, Ls.20-25; Supp. Tr., p.187, 
Ls.6-7, p.188, L.12; Supp. Tr., p.186, Ls.10-24.) She also told Officer Wiggins that 
there was blood all over her blanket and the floor. ( See, e.g., Defense Exhibit B at 
12:20.) However, Officer Wiggins noticed no blood on the floor, and did not deem it 
necessary to seize the blanket as evidence that night. (See, e.g., Supp. Tr., p.69, 
L.25 - p.70, L.14; Supp. Tr., p.102, L.24 - p.103, L.2 (indicating Officer Wiggins did not 
seize the blanket until a follow up investigation a week later.) 
SJM also did not inform Nurse Hansen that she had run barelegged through 
foliage and across gravel, which likely impacted Nurse Hansen's conclusions about the 
scratches to SJM's back, legs, and buttocks. Those scratches were instead attributed 
to Mr. Anderson when he supposedly took her pants off. (See Defense Exhibit B at 
4:15.) However, according to Officer Skott Mealer, there was no evidence of a struggle 
on Mr. Anderson - no debris or blood under his fingernails and no other signs of a 
struggle on him. (Supp. Tr., p.214, Ls.7-20.) Furthermore, Nurse Hansen testified that 
SJM had told her she had been bitten multiple times, but when she testified at trial, SJM 
said there was only one bite. (Compare Supp. Tr., p.139, Ls.19-20 with Supp. Tr., 
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p.189, Ls. 7-9.) The lack of physical evidence corroborating SJ M's testimony 
demonstrates the insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction in this case. 
Furthermore, the testimony of independent witnesses also belies SJM's 
assertions about the commotion she was making. Mr. Wessler testified that 
Mr. Anderson came into his cabin at approximately 11 :30. (Supp. Tr., p.270, Ls.5-10.) 
As such, Mr. Anderson would not have arrived at SJM's trailer until approximately 
midnight. Therefore, the time frame she gave (a total of thirty to forty-five minutes) 
would mean that Mr. Anderson would have had to still be assaulting her when 
Mr. MacDuff was walking up to his trailer at approximately 12:30. (See Supp. 
Tr., p.160, Ls.8-10 (Mr. MacDuff testifying he left the bar at approximately 12:30); Supp, 
Tr., p.126, L.10 (Officer Wiggins testifying he received the call out at 12:48).) And SJM 
testified that she was screaming, fighting, and resisting Mr. Anderson throughout the 
incident. (Supp. Tr., p.185, Ls.20-25, p.187, Ls.6-7, p.188, L.12.) The two trailers were 
relatively close to each other. (State's Exhibit 36 (Officer Wiggins' diagram of the area, 
indicating the trailers are forty feet apart); see State's Exhibit 9 (photograph showing 
Mr. MacDuff's trailer from SJM's trailer).) However, Mr. MacDuff apparently did not hear 
anything distressing or out of the ordinary, as he went into his house and began to fix 
himself some food. (See Supp. Tr., p.160, Ls.8-18.) 
In addition, Mr. Anderson did not exhibit guilty behavior. For example, he stayed 
in SJM's trailer after she left, believing she intended to return. (Supp. Tr., p.258, 
Ls.7-20.) He also did not try to hide when Officer Wiggins drove past him in a marked 
police vehicle. (See Supp. Tr., p.259, Ls.13-22; Supp. Tr., p.14, Ls.16-21; Supp. 
Tr., p.71, Ls.21-25 (describing the markings on the vehicle).) This evidence, indicating 
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that nothing inappropriate occurred between Mr. Anderson and SJM, further 
demonstrates the insufficiency of the State's evidence. 
Therefore, as recognized by the district court, this is not a case where there is 
overwhelming evidence of guilt. Quite to the contrary, the jury could have very easily 
acquitted Mr. Anderson. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.146, Ls.1-2; Tr., Vol.1, p.146, L.25 - p.147, 
L.13.) As such, the harm done by each incident of misconduct, particularly those 
comments on the credibility of certain evidence or testimony, is increased in this case, 
to the point where it is beyond mere possibility that each individual instance could have 
swayed the jury's verdict, thereby depriving Mr. Anderson of a fair trial. Compare 
Phillips, 144 Idaho at 89 (holding that, because the verdict in that case hinged largely on 
the credibility determination, the pattern of misconduct there increased the chances that 
the misconduct impacted the verdict, resulting in the need to vacate the conviction); see 
also Betancourt, 151 Idaho at 640 (reversing a conviction because the court could not 
determine "beyond a reasonable doubt that the incident of prosecutorial misconduct did 
not contribute to the verdict"). As such, based on the facts of this case, if misconduct is 
shown, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement did not 
contribute to the verdict. Therefore, each improper statement in this case violated 
Mr. Anderson's unwaived constitutional right to a fair trial, was clear on the record, and 
was not harmless. Therefore, each improper statement individually constitutes 
fundamental error, entitling Mr. Anderson to a new trial. 
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IV. 
The Accumulation Of Errors In This Case Deprived Mr. Anderson Of A Fair Trial 
Although Mr. Anderson contends that each of the errors complained of above 
were prejudicial, to the extent that this Court disagrees and finds any of those errors to 
be harmless, Mr. Anderson asserts that he is entitled to a new trial nonetheless. He 
submits that the above errors, when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in 
contravention of his constitutional right to due process. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453; 
Paciorek, 137 Idaho at 635; Vandenacre, 131 Idaho at 513. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court grant review. On review, he 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction, or alternatively, vacate his 
conviction and remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 25th day of February, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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